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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SHANNON TY MELVIN, / 
Petitioner/Appellee, / 
vs. / Appeal No. 20060643-CA 
STEPHEN T. BAKER, Jr, / 
Respondent/Appellant / 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction lies in this court pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) (1953 as 
amended.) 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether Judge Skanchy's award of a judgment to Mrs. Melvin in 
the amount of $27,124.85 for overdue daycare costs and medical expenses was 
supported by the evidence; 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A trial court's findings of fact are 
reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. Taylor v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 923, 929 
(UtahApp. 1998). 
2, Whether it was plain error for Judge Skanchy not to recuse himself 
after Melvin wrote a letter to Governor Huntsman alleging the judge was 
incompetent? 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW: To establish plain error, a party must show 
that "(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) 
the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable outcome for the appellant." Berkshires, L.L.C. v. Sykes, 2005 UT App. 536, f 
21,127P.3dl243. 
3. Whether the trial court committed plain error in granting Melvin 
judgment rather than concluding that Melvin5 s claims were barred because they 
had not been raised prior to the December 2005 Order to Show Cause. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The same standard of review exists for 
this issue as for the second. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Disposition of this appeal is governed U.C.A. §§ 78-45-7.15 and 78-45-
7.16, both of which were attached as Addendum C to Appellant's brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The parties herein were divorced on December 21, 1994. R. 41. As a 
component of the Decree, each party was ordered to pay one-half of the children's 
portion of the health insurance premium, one-half of non-covered medical and 
dental expenses, and one-half of daycare expenses. R. 49. 
On November 4, 1997, Mrs. Melvin filed an order to show cause seeking 
judgment for past daycare and medical expenses. R. 135-37. On December 26, 
1997, the Third District Court ordered: 
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a. Mr. Baker was to pay one-half of all uncovered medical and dental 
expenses and work-related daycare expenses; 
b. Mrs. Melvin was to provide evidence of the expenses she had 
incurred prior to that date; 
c. Mr. Baker was to make payments in the amount of $100.00 towards 
the arrearage; and 
d. Mr. Baker was to pay his share of ongoing daycare (at that time 
$273.00 per month) on or before the 10 of each month. R. 151. 
On September 15, 2004, the State of Utah intervened and filed a Petition to 
Modify Mr. Baker's child support obligation. R. 194. This Petition to Modify 
was set for trial on December 1, 2005, and the parties appeared on that date and 
advised the court that a settlement had been reached as to child support. R. 439. 
Between 1997 and 2005, the parties had had many disputes regarding 
visitation, which resulted in a finding on March 17, 2005, that Mrs. Melvin should 
be held in contempt of court. R. 389. On April 19, 2005, Mrs. Melvin wrote a 
letter to Governor Huntsman complaining that Judge Skanchy was incompetent. 
R. 405. 
In December of 2005, Mrs. Melvin filed a new order to show cause seeking 
judgment for unpaid medical and daycare arrearages. R. 441. On April 11, 2006, 
the Court held an evidentiary hearing regarding Mrs. Melvin's allegations. R. 785. 
The Court concluded that Mr. Baker was in arrears and entered judgment in favor 
of Mrs. Melvin in the amount of $27,124.85. R. 731. This appeal ensued. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A. THE JUDGMENT IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Mr. Baker's challenge of Judge Skanchy's factual findings is facially deficient 
because he failed to marshal the evidence. Baker merely sets forth the testimony 
of the witnesses, then concludes that "clear evidence" showed that Melvin's 
evidence was "faked." (See Appellant's Brief p. 14.) 
The trial court heard testimony from Jeff Melvin, Appellee's husband, 
verifying the expenses incurred, that he himself had paid the expenses, and that 
notice was properly sent to Baker as required by statute. In a credibility contest, 
the court elected to believe Melvin. The judge's choice to believe one witness 
over another is not a basis to overturn a judgment on appeal. 
B. BAKER'S APPEAL REGARDING THE ASSESSMENT OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES IS WAIVED. 
Baker's brief did not argue whether the district court erred in awarding 
Melvin attorney's fees. Baker has waived this issue on appeal. 
C. THE JUDGMENT IS NOT BARRED BY RES JUDICATA. 
In an argument raised for the first time on appeal, Baker argues that Melvin 
should have been barred from filing her December 2005 Order to Show Cause 
because she had not raised the issue of the arrearages since the previous Order to 
Show Cause in December of 1997. Baker's argument fails to identify that Melvin 
had any obligation to raise the arrearages before December of 2005 and thus why 
Melvin would be barred for not doing so. 
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To the contrary, Melvin brought her claim within the appropriate statute of 
limitations. No evidence was presented to suggest that her claim was waived, 
equitably or otherwise, except Baker's testimony that he never received notice of 
the bills. (The trial court judge elected not to believe Baker on this point.) There 
was no obligation that Melvin address the issue at the December 2005 trial, which 
was set on the State's Petition to Modify child support. 
As Baker did not raise the issue of res judicata below, Baker must establish 
that the trial court committed plain error in not concluding Melvin's claims were 
barred. Baker cannot do so because there simply is no reason why Melvin's 
claims would be barred. 
D. JUDGE SKANCHY WAS UNDER NO OBLIGATION TO 
RECUSE HIMSELF. 
As neither party filed a motion asking that the trial court judge be 
disqualified, Baker argues for the first time on appeal that Judge Skanchy should 
have recused himself rather than continue to hear this case following Melvin's 
April 2005 letter. Baker cannot establish that the judge was inappropriately 
biased, much less that it was plain error for the judge to have failed to recuse 
himself. 
E. MELVIN SHOULD BE AWARDED ATTORNEY'S FEES 
ON APPEAL. 
The lower court found Baker to be in contempt and awarded Melvin 
judgment for the medical and daycare arrearages as well as for attorney's fees. 
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Similarly, Melvin should be awarded attorney's fees incurred in the necessity of 
defending the judgment on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I - THE JUDGMENT IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE, 
A. BAKER FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE. 
The district court in this case entered written Findings of Fact supporting 
the judgment. R. 729-27. The findings include: that Melvin had provided Baker 
with verification of expenses (#10, #11, #12, #17, and #19); that Baker was aware 
of the debt owed (#15, #16, #17, #20); that Baker had the ability to pay pursuant 
to the court order (#22 and #23); and that Baker had willfully refused to pay his 
obligation (#21, #22, and #23). 
On appeal, Baker argues that these findings were not supported by the 
evidence. In order to challenge a factual finding, "[a]n appellant must marshal the 
evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this 
evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against the 
clear weight of the evidence." In re: Estate of Bartell 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 
1989) (quotations omitted). Unless the evidence is marshaled, this court shall 
assume that all findings are adequately supported by the evidence. In re: Estate of 
Beeslev, 883 P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1994). 
This obligation of the appellant is critical. The nature of this duty and its 
import were discussed at length by the Supreme Court in Chen v. Stewart. 2004 UT 
82, 100 P.3d 1177. The Court cited the Utah Court of Appeals in its explanation that "in 
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order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the challenger must 
present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence 
introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists." Id. at 177 
(quoting Neely v. Bennett 2002 UT App 189,1} 11, 51 P.3d 724 (emphasis omitted)). 
An appellant may not merely re-argue the factual case at it was presented to the 
trial court. Id. (citing Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage & Warehouse Inc., 872 P.2d 
1051, 1053 (Utah Ct.App.1994)). Nor may a party merely summarize all of the evidence 
that was submitted at trial. Id Rather, the appellant must actually play "devil's 
advocate." Id at f 78 (quoting Harding v. Bell, 2002 UT 108,119, 57 P.3d 1093). The 
appellant must make the case from the appellee's perspective, construing all facts in 
favor of the appellee, and then explain why the trial court's findings are against the clear 
weight of the evidence. Id (citations and quotations omitted). 
Baker has utterly failed to marshal the evidence in support of the judgment. 
Baker's brief reiterates the evidence that was before the trial court, then announces that 
there was no evidence to support the conclusion. In particular, Baker appears to take 
issue with the court's finding that he was given actual notice of the expenses. 
At the evidentiary hearing, copies of the monthly statements sent to Mr. Baker 
were admitted as Exhibit 1. T. 5-6. All of the bills and notices that were submitted to 
Baker were admitted as Exhibits 2 and 3. T. 11-12. These documents were admitted 
based on testimony that the documents were actually sent to Mr. Baker. After 
summarizing this evidence, Baker concludes, "It does not appear and there is no record 
showing that Mr. Baker was provided the opportunity to validate whether Mr. Baker was 
giving notice each month that those payments were being made, even accepting Mr. 
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Melvin's testimony that he had mailed monthly statements out to Mr. Baker." 
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 13-14 (sic).) 
Appellant cannot shift his burden to marshal by claiming that there is no evidence 
to support the trial court's findings. "This would inappropriately force an appellee to 
marshal the evidence in order to refute an appellant's assertion of the absence of 
evidence." Chen, 2004 UT at 179 (citing Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fraden Mfg. Corp., 
2002 UT 94,122, 54 P.3d 1177.) The appellant's failure to marshal the evidence 
should result in this Court assuming that the trial court's findings are correct and 
affirming the lower court's decision. Chen, 2004 UT at If 80 (citations omitted.) 
B. THE JUDGMENT IS SUPPORTED BY ADEQUATE EVIDENCE. 
Baker appears to take issue with three points in particular of the trial court's 
findings: (1) that the trial court elected to believe Melvin's testimony and documents 
over Baker's testimony, thus denying Baker equitable treatment; (2) that the trial court 
concluded Baker had timely notice as required by U.C.A. § 78-45-7.15; and (3) that the 
court's judgment did not reflect the evidence but rather represented an effort by the trial 
court to placate Mrs. Melvin. 
Deference must be given to the trial court's determination of credibility, as it was 
the trial court judge who observed the witnesses and their demeanor. Hone v. Hone, 
2004 UT App. 241, | 5, 95 P.3d 1221 (citation omitted). Further, "because a trial court 
is in an "advantaged position" to consider equities, we give 'considerable deference to 
[its] findings and judgment. Id. (quoting Jacobson v. Jacobsoa 557 P.2d 156, 158 (Utah 
1976)). 
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Mr. Melvin testified that he had sent statements and copies of bills on a monthly 
basis. In light of this testimony, the trial court chose not to believe Baker when Baker 
testified that he had not received notice of the expenses. This is a credibility judgment 
that should not be disturbed on appeal. 
Similarly, Baker's argument that no validation was provided and that the claims 
were thus time-barred lacks merit. The evidence established that statements and copies 
of bills were sent on a monthly basis. Baker's assertion appears to be that he should 
have been relieved of his obligations under the Decree of Divorce because, although he 
had actual copies of the bills, he did not receive a separate notice that the bills had been 
paid. The trial court appropriately found that the written documentation provided to 
Baker satisfied the notice requirements of the statute. 
Baker's final argument merely reiterates that the trial court's findings were 
inconsistent with the evidence. Baker's contention is actually that the trial court's 
findings disagreed with his evidence. The court found Melvin's testimony and exhibits 
credible and entered judgment accordingly. Baker cannot establish that the trial court 
clearly erred in awarding judgment. 
POINT II - BAKER HAS WAIVED HIS ARGUMENT REGARDING 
ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
The second issue identified by Baker in his docketing statement was the propriety 
of the trial court's award of attorney's fees to Melvin. As Baker may not raise a new 
issue in his reply brief, his failure to argue the issue in his principle brief should be 
construed as a waiver of this argument. Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, f 23, 16 P.3d 
540. 
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POINT III - MELVIN'S JUDGMENT WAS NOT BARRED 
BY RES JUDICATA. 
For the first time on appeal, Baker argues that Melvin's claims for reimbursement 
should have been barred by res judicata. "As a general rule, appellate courts will not 
consider an issue, including a constitutional argument, raised for the first time on appeal 
unless the trial court committed plain error or the case involves exceptional 
circumstances." State v. Brown. 856 P.2d 358, 359 (Utah App. 1993). "The trial court is 
considered 'the proper forum in which to commence thoughtful and probing analysis' of 
issues." Id. at 360 (quoting State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1273 (Utah App. 1990)). 
"Failing to argue an issue and present pertinent evidence in that forum denies the trial 
court 'the opportunity to make any findings of fact or conclusions of law' pertinent to the 
claimed error." Id (quoting LeBaron & Assocs., Inc. v. Rebel Enters., Inc.. 823 P.2d 
479, 483 n. 6 (Utah Ct.App.1991)). The choice to raise an issue for the first time on 
appeal may well be fatal to the appeal. Marchand v. Marchand 2006 UT App 429,19, 
147P.3d538. 
To prevail on this issue, Baker must establish that the trial court committed plain 
error by showing that "(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the 
trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant." Berkshires, L.L.C., 2005 UT 
App. at If 21. Baker fails the first prong of this test in that Baker cannot establish that the 
court committed any error on the issue of res judicata. 
It is certainly true that res judicata principles apply in divorce proceedings. 
Jacobsenv. Jacobsen. 703 P.2d 303, 305 (Utah 1985) (holding "When there has been an 
adjudication, it becomes res judicata as to those issues which were either tried and 
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determined, or upon all issues which the party had a fair opportunity to present and have 
determined in the other proceeding.") However, Baker strains for a unique application of 
the rule. Baker's argument may be broken down into two components. First, Baker 
suggests that Melvin waived her claims by not addressing them at the trial set for 
December 1, 2005. Second, Baker argues that Melvin is barred because she did not raise 
the financial issues between 1997 and 2005, although the parties had numerous other 
hearings during the interim. 
With respect to the first argument, to prevail Baker would first have to 
demonstrate that the trial was intended to address the question of arrearages for medical 
and daycare. Baker's statement in his brief is, "In this matter, the parties had a trial set 
for 'all claims' on December 1, 2005, which included to alleged [sic] determine any 
judgments for arrears." (Appellant's Brief p. 23.) Baker cites to R. 439, which are the 
minutes of the bench trial. There is no reference to "all claims" in the entry. The clerk's 
notes show that the parties reached a partial agreement (on the issue of how to calculate 
ongoing child support) and that Melvin's counsel advised the court that an Order to 
Show Cause had been filed to specifically address the issue of arrears. It is clear that the 
parties and the court contemplated at the trial that the arrearage issue was being reserved. 
As there was no pre-trial order or any similar order setting forth what issues were to be 
tried, it cannot be said that Melvin's claims are res judicata because they were not 
addressed on December 1, 2005. 
Turning to the second argument, Baker has cited no authority for his proposition 
that Melvin was somehow obligated to bring her Order to Show Cause before she did in 
December of 2005. Melvin was free to bring her claim at any time before the statute of 
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limitations expired. Baker can cite to no agreement or other behavior on Melvin's part 
that could have created an equitable estoppel issue. Baker's sole argument appears to be 
that Melvin could have asked for judgment sooner, but chose not to do so. 
This is insufficient to bring the doctrine of res judicata to bear, particularly on a 
plain error analysis. As Appellant notes in his brief, claim preclusion prevents 
relitigation of claims that have actually been litigated or that "could and should have 
been litigated" in a prior action. Krambule v. Krambule, 994 P.2d 210, 214 (Utah App. 
1999) (citations omitted). The crux here is the "should have" part of the phrase. While 
Melvin certainly could have raised her claim earlier, Baker can cite to no authority as to 
why she "should have." Baker's claim that res judicata bars this judgment must 
therefore fail. 
POINT IV - JUDGE SKANCHY HAD NO OBLIGATION TO 
RECUSE HIMSELF. 
In his second new-on-appeal argument, Baker contends that it was plain error 
(and, in fact, a violation of the Due Process Clause) for Judge Skanchy to have remained 
on the case after Melvin wrote a letter complaining about him to Governor Huntsman in 
April of 2005. There are two flaws to this argument. 
The first is the timing of Baker's complaint. Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure specifically provides that a motion to disqualify a judge must be filed 
twenty days after assignment of the case to the judge or when the party should have 
learned of the grounds on which the motion is based. No one ever filed a motion to 
disqualify Judge Skanchy. In fact, after Melvin's letter, there were numerous times when 
Judge Skanchy presided over the case with no one's objection. Specifically: an order to 
show cause hearing on June 6, 2005 (R. 418-419); the pre-trial conference on November 
12 
3, 2005 (R. 437); the trial on December 1, 2005 (R. 438-439); the initial Order to Show 
Cause hearing on these claims on January 23, 2006 (R. 694-695); and the evidentiary 
hearing on April 11, 2006 (R. 722-723). If Baker had any reason to think that Judge 
Skanchy would be biased one way or the other after Melvin's letter of complaint, it 
should have been raised months before now. 
The second problem is that where no one did file a motion to disqualify, Baker 
must now convince this Court that it was plain error for Judge Skanchy not to notice a 
problem and recuse himself. Baker argues that Judge Skanchy's judgment on this issue 
was a result of kowtowing to Melvin because he feared another letter rather than a ruling 
on the facts. l 
Baker can offer nothing but suspicion and conjecture to support his theory, and 
more is required to demonstrate that a judge should be removed from a case. Contrary to 
Baker's assertions, the mere appearance of a problem is insufficient. " . . . [E]ven 
disqualification because of appearance must have some basis in fact and be grounded on 
more than mere conjecture and speculation." Madsen v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan, 
767 P.2d 538, 544 (Utah 1988). When reviewing a motion to disqualify, the court must 
initially presume that the judge is qualified. In re: Affidavit of Bias, 947 P.2d 1152, 1153 
(Utah 1997) (memorandum decision of Zimmerman, C.J., sitting alone). It is up to the 
moving party to overcome that presumption. L± 
1
 It is interesting to note that at the June 13 Order to Show Cause hearing (R. 408), 
Judge Skanchy ordered Melvin to reimburse Baker for any difference in airfare for 
the summer visit. One could construe this as a ruling against Melvin, which 
contradicts Baker's theory that Judge Skanchy was afraid to rule against her after 
her letter of complaing. 
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The only evidence Baker offers of any bias is a reargument of his position that 
Judge Skanchy failed to follow the law when the trial court concluded that Baker had 
been given valid and appropriate notice of the debts. As argued above, the trial court's 
ruling was based on the testimony and documents provided by Mr. Melvin. The trial 
court's conclusion did not deny Baker an "equitable opportunity to validate the debts." 
The trial court found Mr. Melvin's testimony that he paid the debts was adequate proof to 
warrant an order that reimbursement be made. 
In sum, the only evidence Baker has is an adverse ruling, which is facially 
insignificant in determining whether a judge is biased. Id As neither party objected to 
having Judge Skanchy continue on the case for a year after Melvin's letter, it cannot be 
said that it was plain error for Judge Skanchy to have failed to recuse himself. 
POINT V - MELVIN SHOULD BE AWARDED ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
"Generally, when the trial court awards fees in a domestic action to the 
party who then substantially prevails on appeal, fees will also be awarded to that 
party on appeal." Lyngle v. Lyngle, 831 P.2d 1027, 1031 (Utah App. 1992). 
Melvin was awarded attorney's fees below. Although Baker indicated in the 
docketing statement that he was appealing this ruling, it was not argued in his 
brief and is therefore waived. Therefore, Melvin should be awarded her 
attorney's fees on appeal as well. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's judgment is supported by the record. Melvin offered both 
testimony and documentary evidence to verify that expenses had been incurred, 
that notification was properly sent to Baker under the statute, and that Baker had 
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refused to pay the expenses. Baker's complaint that the judge should have 
believed him, not the Melvins, is not a basis to overturn the judgment on appeal. 
Further, Baker cannot establish that it was plain error to deny judgment on 
the basis of res judicata. Melvin's claims had not been litigated before, and Baker 
cannot show that Melvin had any obligation to present the Order to Show Cause 
before it was filed in December of 2005. Baker's argument that the trial judge 
should have recused himself is similarly without merit, as Baker has no evidence 
that the judge was biased against either party. 
For the foregoing reasons, the district court's judgment should be 
AFFIRMED, and Melvin should be awarded attorney's fees and costs on appeal. 
DATED this / f day of March, 2007. 
/?%*•— 
KEVIN P. SULLIVAN 
Attorney for Appellee 
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